Expected investment growth (EIG) is a strong predictor for cross-sectional stock returns. Between July 1953 and December 2015 in the US, an investment strategy that takes a long position in firms with high EIG and a short position in firms with low EIG generates an average annual return of more than 20%, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.01. This return predictability holds both in subperiods and in different subsamples of firms, as well as in all other G7 countries. Leading empirical factor models including CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model, and the recent Hou, Xue, and Zhang four-factor model and Fama and French five-factor model all fail to fully capture the profitability of this investment strategy. Further analyses suggest that EIG is closely related to financial distress risk, especially at a short horizon up to one year, and is a better predictor of stock returns than failure probability from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). We provide supporting evidence for both risk-based explanation and behavioral explanation for this large EIG premium. * We thank
Introduction
Corporate investment has been shown to be very important for asset prices at both the aggregate level and the firm level. Since the seminal paper by Cochrane (1991) , there has been rapid growth in the investment-based asset pricing literature in the past two decades. Studies such as Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) document that past investment negatively predicts stock returns, whereas Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find that stock returns can be strongly related to past asset growth, the most comprehensive measure of investment (Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) ).
In this paper, we document that another investment-related variable -the expected investment growth (or EIG thereafter) -is a strong predictor for both investment growth and stock returns.
A measure of unobserved investment plan, the expected investment growth is forward-looking and could contain important information about the expected return (e.g., Christiano and Todd (1996) , Lamont (2000) ). In contrast to the negative relation between past investment and stock return, a long-short investment strategy that takes a long position in high EIG firms and a short position in low EIG firms generates an average return of 20.8% per year, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.01, in the US sample between July 1953 and December 2015. To illustrate its historical performance, Figure 1 plots the cumulative returns of this long-short investment strategy. As a comparison, we also plot the cumulative returns of the market, value, and momentum strategies which are normalized to have the same return standard deviation as the EIG strategy. 1 Though outperformed by the market strategy in earlier years before mid 1960s, the EIG strategy generates the best performance since then. Starting from $1 at the beginning of the sample (July 1953) , the cumulative wealth for the EIG strategy is $10,673 at the end of 2015, which is significantly greater than $112 for the market strategy, $19.3 for the value premium strategy, and $3,325.7 for the momentum strategy. Even in recent years, the EIG strategy has much better performance than the other three investment strategies. For instance, the cumulative return from January 2001 to December 2015 is 358.1% for EIG, in contrast with 105.4% for market, 142.7% for value, and only 9.9% for momentum due to the large momentum crash in 2009. Standard factors do not fully capture the superior performance of the EIG strategy. The annualized abnormal returns from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor model are 21.9% (tstatistic = 8.64), 24.0% (t-statistic = 9.57), and 12.9% (t-statistic = 5.47), respectively. Even controlling for the more recent Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) four factors and the Fama and French (2015) five factors, our EIG strategy remains largely profitable: the corresponding abnormal returns are 13.9% (t-statistic = 4.21) and 21.0% (t-statistic = 6.36), respectively. In addition, the strategy profitiability is not just from the short leg: the abnormal returns of the high EIG decile on the long leg remain highly significant after controlling for above-mentioned factors.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
We check the robustness of the EIG return predictability in several ways. In the time series, we repeat our analysis in the two subperiods divided by the mid point of our full sample period (December 1984) and find the result to be similarly strong in both samples. In the cross section, we select four different subsamples: New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed firms, firms listed in NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX), S&P 500 index constituents, and stocks with a lag price greater than $5. In all four subsamples of firms, we reach the same qualitative conclusion.
In addition, we create 5-by-5 portfolios double-sorted by one firm characteristic (size, book-tomarket ratio, momentum, gross profitability, asset growth, or past investment growth) and EIG.
The return spread between high and low EIG firms conditional on these characteristics remains large and statistically significant. Lastly, we extend our analysis to the international data and find the positive relation between EIG and future stock returns to be strong in all other G7 countries.
The main variable of interest, EIG, is constructed from the cross-sectional regression of investment growth on the prior 2-12 month stock return (i.e., momentum), q, and cash flow. Consistent with the intuition that firms with better stock and accounting performance (measured by momentum and cash flow) and greater growth opportunities (higher q) are likely to have more future investment, we find the coefficients on all three predictive variables to be positive and highly significant when constructing EIG. However, our analysis suggests that it is not one specific variable, but rather the interaction of these three variables, that generates this strong return predictability of EIG. When we create decile portfolios based separately on momentum, q, and cash flow, the performance of these long-short portfolios are much weaker than our EIG strategy for the same sample period. This result also suggests that the investment growth on the left-hand-side of the first-stage predictive regression contains valuable information about the interaction of these righthand-side variables that is related to future stock returns. To illustrate this point, we replace, in the first-stage estimation, the future investment growth by future sales growth or gross profit growth while keeping the same right-hand-side variables (momentum, q, and cash flow) and find much weaker return predictability of these alternative expected growth measures. Taken together, these results imply that the components of momentum, q, and cash flow that can jointly predict investment growth are also informative about future stock returns.
To better understand why EIG predicts future stock return, we first uncover a close relation between EIG and financial distress risk. Using four measures of financial distress from the existing literature-failure probability (or FP thereafter, from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) ), distance to default (Merton (1974) ), Ohlson (1980) O-score, and Altman (1968) Z-score, we find that EIG is indeed strongly and negatively related to financial distress risk. In a univariate logit model in predicting bankruptcy, we find that the coefficient of EIG is negative and statistically significant from 1-month to 36-month horizons. Even after controlling for FP, our EIG measure remains significant up to 12-month horizon. These results indicate that EIG has additional predictive power for corporate bankruptcy beyond FP, especially at the horizon of shorter than one year.
However, when we focus on the stock return predictability, it turns out that EIG is a much stronger predictor than FP. In the 5-by-5 portfolios sequentially double-sorted by FP and EIG, we find that conditional on FP, EIG can strongly predict future returns with a conditional EIG premium of 7.8% per year (t-statistic = 3.18), whereas the average FP premium conditional on EIG is only 3.9% per year (t-statistic = 1.30). The dynamics of these portfolios provides an explanation for why EIG is a better return predictor than FP. For both EIG and FP portfolios, the buy-and-hold profitability of the long-short strategy is only positive in the first year; starting from the second year, the strategy return becomes almost zero. On the other hand, FP itself is highly persistent over time, whereas our EIG measure is much shorter-lived. If both FP and EIG contain information about future stock returns, the variable with similar persistence as that of the strategy profitability should contain cleaner information because it is less contaminated by noise that is persistent but has little predictive power for future stock returns. Clearly, EIG is better from this perspective.
Second, we provide some empirical evidence for understanding the large EIG premium from both risk-based and behaviorial point of view. On the rational side, we find that this strategy payoff is highly procyclical with respect to the aggregate consumption growth. Specifically, in a two-factor model time series regression with the market excess return and aggregate consumption growth as the risk factors, we find the return of low EIG stocks has a negative consumption beta whereas the return of high EIG firms has a positive consumption risk exposure. More importantly, when we also include the quadratic term for aggregate consumption growth in the time series regression, we find the coefficient on the consumption growth (squared consumption growth) is strongly negative (positive) for low EIG firms. These estimated coefficients suggest that while the payoff of the low EIG portfolio is countercyclcial, its consumption beta is strongly procyclcial: the consumption exposure of low EIG firms is especially more negative in bad time when the risk premium is high (e.g,. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , Case II of Bansal and Yaron (2004) 
)).
This behavior of low EIG stocks provides an effective hedge for business cycle fluctuations, and the risk premium demanded by investors would be low or even negative compared to high EIG firms.
On the behavioral side, we find that the behavioral bias-based mispricing could also potentially drive a portion of the EIG premium. The low EIG stocks show similar feature as lottery-like assets. If investors have a strong preference for lottery, these stocks could have been overpriced and have lower returns in the future. Further, the EIG premium is significantly stronger among firms with more severe limits to arbitrage and/or information uncertainty, for instance, firms with high idiosyncratic volatility, low institutional ownership, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. With high information uncertainty, investors' investment decisions tend to be more affected by their behavioral biases such as lottery preference, leaving more room for mispricing. At the same time, arbitrage costs could deter the mispricing from being fully corrected. This paper contributes to the fast-growing literature of investment-based asset pricing. Standard q-theory models of investment predict that firms with high past investment have low future returns, because a lower cost of capital induces more capital expenditure. Cochrane (1996) finds that the aggregate investment growth is a risk factor that helps to price cross section of stock returns.
Using general method of moments (GMM) structural estimations, Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) find that the Euler equation implied from a firm's optimization problem could capture the average stock returns of earnings surprises, book-to-market equity, and capital investment. Anderson and GARCIA-FEIJÓO (2006) relate the growth in capital expenditure to firm's size and book-to-market ratios. Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) propose a four-factor asset pricing model based on q-theory and find this empirical factor model can well capture a broad cross section of stock returns. 2
The paper is also closely related to the strand of literature that studies financial distress. Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) , among many others, explore accounting variables that predict corporate bankruptcy. Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) , and more recently, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) estimate dynamic logit or hazard model by including both accounting and stock market variables. In particular, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) document that a failure probability measure that incorporate firm characteristics including profitability, leverage, cash flow, stock returns, and volatility can strongly predict corporate bankruptcy. The goal of our paper is not to propose another bankruptcy predictor. However, we still find it interesting that firms' EIG can add to the predictive power for corporate bankruptcy beyond FP, especially at the shorter horizon of less than one year.
The empirical evidence on the relation between financial distress and future stock returns is mixed in the literature. Studies including Griffin and Lemmon (2002) , Vassalou and Xing (2004) , Chava and Purnanandam (2010) , and Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner (2014) find distressed stocks have higher future stock returns, consistent with the Merton (1974) default structural model. On the other hand, Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find exactly the opposite. Several explanations have been proposed to understand the latter puzzling finding, including shareholder recoveries in Garlappi and Yan (2011) , financial distress costs and optimal capital structure decisions in George and Hwang (2010) , and lottery-based interpretation in Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2014) . Our empirical analysis supports a negative relation between financial distress and stock returns, but also highlights that the negative relation is particularly strong for the shorthorizon component of the financial distress risk. In addition, we provide some empirical evidence for both risk-based and behavioral explanations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data sources and variable construction. Section 3 discusses the investment strategy based on EIG. In Section 4, we relate EIG to financial distress risk. We also provide some potential explanations for the large EIG premium from both rational and behaviorial perspectives. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks.
Data
Our data comes from several sources. Stock data are from monthly and daily CRSP database.
Accounting data are from Compustat Annually database. The aggregate consumption growth data is from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Our main variable, EIG, is computed in two steps. In the first step, for every year t, we run the following cross-sectional investment growth predictive regression using all NYSE common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) with a December fiscal year end: 3
where investment growth (IG) is the growth rate of investment expenditure (Compustat data item CAPX), momentum (MOM) is the cumulative stock return from January to November in that year, q is the market value of the firm (sum of Market equity, long-term debt, and preferred stock minus inventories and deferred taxes) divided by capital (Compustat data item PPEGT), and cash flow (CF) is the sum of depreciation (Compustat data item DP) and income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) divided by capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). 4 We choose these variables because MOM and CF contain information about stock and accounting performance, which have been shown to be related to future investment expenditure, 5 whereas q is generally considered as a measure of growth opportunities. We also avoid including too many predictive variables to create an in-sample over-fitting in the first stage, which tends to be associated with poor out-of-sample predictions. In the second step, we compute the monthly EIG as the outof-sample predicted value of investment growth from Equation (1) for all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ common shares (excluding financial and utility stocks) using the most up-to-date annual accounting and stock return information of their own, as well as the estimation coefficients from the first step. The timing for accounting information follows Fama and French (1993) , so that the accounting variables from fiscal year t are used to calculate EIG from July of year t + 1 to June of year t + 2. MOM is updated every month and is defined as the prior 2-12 month cumulative stock returns. To minimize estimation errors and avoid look-ahead bias, we use the time series average of the estimated coefficients (b 0,t , b M OM,t , b q,t , and b CF,t ) from the historically available data to construct the out-of-sample EIG. Table 1 report the result for the investment growth predictive regression in the first step.
The first three columns are for the univariate regression of future investment growth on each predictive variable (MOM, q, and CF), and Column (4) is our benchmark case that includes all three variables. Consistent with our expectations above, the estimated coefficients on CF, MOM, 3 Our estimation procedure makes sure that we only use historically available information to construct EIG. Therefore, the cross-sectional regression for year t can only be estimated after year t + 1 investment growth data becomes publicly available, which is around March or April of year t + 2.
4 Following Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) , we use property, plant, and equipment, instead of total asset (Compustat data item AT), to denominate operating cash flows and the market value of total asset. The result is similar but weaker when we use the total asset as the denominator, and is available upon request.
5 See, for example, Liu and Zhang (2014), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), and Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, Shapiro, and Poterba (1990) . and q are all positive and statistically significant. Based on the estimation in Column (4), a onestandard deviation increase in MOM, q, and CF is associated with an increase in future investment growth by 11.8%, 2.3%, and 4.1%, respectively. Taken together, these three variables explain about 6% of the cross-sectional variation of investment growth.
[Insert Table 1 Here] To validate this firm-level expected investment growth measure, Table 2 reports average future investment growth for portfolios sorted by EIG. Panel A presents the result for the univariate EIG deciles in the first four quarters (Q1-Q4), as well as the first year (Y1), second year (Y2), third year (Y3), and the fifth year (Y5) after the portfolio formation. Consistent with our conjecture, firms with high EIG have higher future growth rate in capital expenditure than firms with low EIG in the first four quarters. For the lowest EIG decile, the average investment growth is consistently negative and statistically significant from zero in all four quarters, which is in sharp contrast with consistently positive and significant investment growth for the high EIG decile. The difference in investment growth rate between the high and low EIG deciles is 11.9% in the first quarter, 13% in the second quarter, 9.1% in the third quarter, and 9.2% in the fourth quarter. However, this difference is relatively short-lived. Even though the investment growth spread between the high and low EIG deciles is 45.8% in the first year, the spread shrinks to only 7.6% in the second year and becomes negative afterwards.
[Insert Table 2 Here] Furthermore, all three variables in the construction of EIG (i.e., MOM, q, and cash flow) contribute to this predictability on future investment growth. To illustrate this, we create 5-by-5 portfolios sequentially double-sorted by each one of the constructing variables and then EIG. Table 2 reports the spread of investment growth in the next year between high and low EIG quintiles conditioning on MOM, q, and cash flows. For the momentum and EIG sorts, the difference in the investment growth between high and low EIG firms ranges from 2.02% in momentum quintile 4 to 25.1% in momentum quintile 1 (i.e., momentum losers), and the average conditional investment growth spread is 11.2% and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 8.9). Therefore, although a large fraction of investment growth predictability comes from the past stock performance (e.g., Liu and Zhang (2014)), our measure of expected investment growth contains additional predictive power for future investment beyond momentum. On the other hand, the average spread in investment growth conditioning on q or cash flow is generally much stronger.
Panel B of
The average spread in investment growth between high and low EIG quintiles is 36.2% conditioning on q and 35.3% conditioning on cash flow.
EIG and Future Stock Returns
In this section, we document that EIG can strongly predict stock returns. This return predictability is robust to different subsamples and is not captured by standard factor models including the recent
Benchmark results
Panel A of Table 3 reports the characteristics of decile portfolios sorted by EIG. The portfolios are rebalanced every month based on the most up-to-date information about EIG. 6 High EIG firms have better past stock performance (MOM) and accounting performance (CF) than low EIG firms.
The average prior 2-12 month cumulative return is 0.94 (−0.37) for high (low) EIG firms, and the corresponding CF is 0.39 and −1.03, respectively. This pattern is consistent with the positive and statistically significant coefficients on MOM and CF in the investment growth predictive regression from Table 1 . The top and bottom decile EIG portfolios have smaller market capitalization (ME).
However, the average firm size for the high EIG portfolio is not extremely small; instead, it is comparable to the average firm size of the third and fourth EIG deciles. Book-to-market ratio (BM), investment rate (IK), and book leverage (LEV) are not monotonic across these portfolios, with high EIG firms having a lower BM and LEV, but slightly higher IK than low EIG firms.
Finally, the gross profitability (GP) increases with EIG, possibly due to the fact that CF and GP are positively correlated.
[Insert Table 3 Here] In Panel B of Table 4 , we report the properties, including the mean, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, skewness, and kurtosis, of the value-weighted excess return of the decile EIG portfolios and the long-short portfolio that takes a long (short) position in the high (low) EIG decile. The average excess return of the low EIG portfolio is −5.57% per year with a standard deviation of 27.40%.
This performance is in contrast with 15.25% mean and 22.62% standard deviation of the excess return of the high EIG portfolio. Consistent with the smooth path of the cumulative return of the EIG strategy reported in Figure 1 , the long-short EIG strategy (Hi-Lo) generates an average return of 20.82% per year with an annual Sharpe ratio of 1.01. In addition, the strategy does not suffer from large negative skewness and fat tails in the realized return distribution as other investment strategies such as momentum, 7 despite some modest losses in recent years. Table 4 reports the result from leading factor model asset pricing model tests. The factor models we consider include the unconditional CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, Carhart (1997) four-factor model, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) four-factor model, as well as the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, which adds two additional factors that are based on the gross profitability premium (Novy-Marx (2013) ) and asset growth premium (Cooper, Gulen, and 6 Since EIG is constructed based on accounting data from the Compustat annual file and price momentum calculated from monthly CRSP data, the transaction cost of implementing the strategy is similar to that of the Fama and French momentum strategy that is based on prior 2-12 month stock returns.
7 For example, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) document a skewness of −4.7 for the long-short momentum strategy based on the monthly data from 192701 to 201303. They also find that the crash of the momentum profit is partly forecastable by market declines and elevated market volatility, and contemporaneous with market rebounds.
result from CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The market factor (MKT), size premium factor(SMB), and value premium factor(HML) are all in the wrong direction in explaining the EIG portfolio spread. For the long-short EIG portfolio in the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model test, the market beta is −0.12 (t-statistic = −1.69), the HML beta is −0.36 (t-statistic = −2.33), and the SMB beta is −0.46 (t-statistic = −3.37). These negative betas imply an even greater profitability after controlling for these factors.
Indeed, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha is 24.04% per year with a t-statistic of 9.57.
Adding momentum factor (UMD) weakens the performance of our strategy, because an important predictive variable in the investment growth predictive regression is momentum. However, Panel C shows that even after including the UMD factor into the factor model, our strategy still generates an admirable four-factor alpha of 12.88% per year with t-statistic of 5.47. This large abnormal return from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model test suggests that our EIG-based investment strategy is beyond the standard momentum.
[Insert Table 4 Here] Panels D and E report the results from the tests based on the more recent Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) four-factor model and Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Again, we find these new factors cannot fully explain the return spread between the high and low EIG portfolios. The abnormal return for the long-short EIG portfolio is 13.86% (t-statistic = 4.21) for the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) four-factor model, and 21.02% (t-statistic = 6.36) in the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. In terms of the factor loadings, the long-short portfolio return has positive and significant correlations with the gross profitability premium (RMW) and return-on-equity (ROE) premium. These exposures are consistent with the characteristics of EIG portfolios from Table 3 .
We want to emphasize that the EIG profitability does not just come from the short leg, which can be a serious concern for many investment strategies due to high costs of short selling (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) ). Instead, the long leg of our investment strategy is still quite profitable. For example, the CAPM alpha, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model alpha, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model alpha is 6.35% (t-statistic = 3.78), 9.13% (t-statistic = 6.71), and 4.39 (t-statistic = 3.52), respectively, for the high EIG portfolio. In untabulated analyses, we also examine the performance of EIG portfolios separately for periods following high and low investor sentiments. We find that the top decile EIG portfolio has very good performance following both high and low sentiment periods, and their corresponding average annualized excess return is 7.24% (t-statistic=3.11) and 11.76% (t-statistic=4.71), respectively.
Robustness checks
In this subsection, we report the results from several robustness checks. We start with subperiod analyses. In Table 5 , we report the mean, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, skewness, and Kurtosis of the EIG portfolio returns, as well as the abnormal returns from Fama and French (1993) threefactor model test from two subperiods: the earlier sample from July 1953 to December 1984 and the later sample from January 1985 to December 2015. The performance of our EIG strategy across these two subperiods is impressively similar. The average annual return is 19.73% in the earlier sample and 21.92% in the later sample. The Sharpe ratios are both about 1.01; the skewness is slightly more negative in the earlier sample (−0.51) than the later sample (−0.34). In addition, the three-factor alpha is large in both samples (25.16% vs 24.31%). 9
[Insert Table 5 Here] Table 6 reports the results from the same analyses using different subsamples of firms. Panel A includes only firms in NYSE. Despite the higher liquidity, the EIG strategy still generates an average return of 11.11% per year, with a Sharpe ratio of 0.47. Similar results are found for stocks in NYSE and AMEX in Panel B, where the average return is 14.05% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.55.
In Panel C, we test our strategy in the subsample of most liquid and big companies -the S&P 500 constituents. 10 Still, we find an average EIG return of 6.28% per year, which is only marginally significant. However, controlling for the Fama and French (1993) three factors, the abnormal return becomes 11.02% with a t-statistic of 3.64. Lastly, in Panel D, when we exclude stocks with a share price of $5 or less at the end of the previous month, the corresponding return and Sharpe ratio is 16.58% and 0.79, respectively. The results from Table 6 suggest that our results are unlikely to be purely driven by the most illiquid stocks with large bid-ask spreads and transaction costs.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
In Table 7 , we create 5-by-5 portfolios double sorted sequentially by one firm characteristic and then by EIG. The characteristics we consider include firm size (ME), book-to-market ratio (BM), momentum (MOM), gross profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), and past investment growth (IG) that are all well known to predict stock returns. We report the average excess returns (in Panel A) and Fama and French (1993) three-factor model alphas (in Panel B) of the high-minus-low EIG portfolio within each characteristic quintile and the average returns of the high-minus-low EIG portfolios across quintiles based on that characteristic, which can be interpreted as conditional EIG premium.
[Insert Table 7 Here] 9 In untabulated analyses, we repeat the tests for the pre-NASDAQ sample and post-2004 sample. We look at the post-2004 period because we will show in Section 4 that EIG is closely related to the failure probability from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) , who end their sample period at 2003. In both subperiods, we find very robust strategy performance. For instance, in the post-2004 sample, the average return and Fama and French (1993) three-factor model alpha are 11.45% (t-statistic = 2.28) and 12.73% (t-statistic = 2.85), respectively.
10 Specifically, in each month, we include S&P 500 stocks from the previous month to prevent forward-looking bias.
In all six columns of Table 7 , we find the conditional EIG premium to be highly positive and statistically significant. It ranges from 3.50% (t-statistic = 2.52) conditional on momentum to 12.40% (t-statistic = 5.46) conditional on past investment growth. Controlling for Fama and French (1993) three factors makes the premium even stronger, ranging from 6.01% (t-statistic = 4.86)
conditional on momentum to 16.76% (t-statistic = 8.21) conditional on past investment growth.
In addition, there are some interesting patterns about EIG premium across these characteristic quintiles. For instance, the EIG premium is 20.99% per year (t-statistic = 7.65) in growth firms (low BM), much larger than 7.14% (t-statistic = 2.12) in value firms (high BM). Across momentum quintiles, even though the EIG premium is high in both winners and losers, it is actually negative in quintile 3 with no extreme past return realization in either direction. The latter finding could be partly related to the positive correlation between momentum and EIG.
As a final robustness check, we repeat the main portfolio analysis for the other G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and UK). For each country, we compute firm-level EIG in the same way as we did in the US. Returns are converted from local currency to US dollars, and excess returns are in excess of the one-month U.S. T-bill rate. 11 The result, reported in Table 8 , shows a very similar relation between EIG and future stock returns for all other G7
countries. In particular, firms with high EIG have higher average returns than firms with low EIG.
The annualized EIG premium based on the long-short EIG strategy ranges from 8.66% (Sharpe ratio = 0.44) in Japan to 33.75% (Sharpe ratio = 0.99) in Germany. The result in Japan is quite impressive given that the literature has documented that momentum strategies are not profitable in many Asian countries including Japan (e.g., Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) ). Controlling the FamaFrench Global three factors further improves the strategy performance, and the three-factor model abnormal return for the long-short portfolio is statistically significant for all other G7 countries.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Importance of Investment Growth
As discussed in Section 2, EIG is estimated from the cross-sectional regression of firm's investment growth on momentum, q, and cash flow. In other words, EIG is a linear combination of these explanatory variables. One may ask the following natural question: Is the strong return predictability just coming from one of these three components?
The answer is obviously "No". In Panels A, B, and C of Table 9 , we report the average excess returns, Sharpe ratio, and Fama and French (1993) three-factor model alphas of decile portfolios sorted separately by these three components. Panel A is for the momentum portfolios. Consistent with the momentum literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ), momentum winners outperform losers by 21.26% per year, but part of this large return spread is due to the high standard deviation, as the Sharpe ratio of 0.74 is much lower than 1.01 for our EIG premium. Panels B and C report the results for the portfolios sorted by q and cash flow, respectively. Firms with high q (low cash 11 See Appendix for more details on the international data.
flow) have lower average returns than firms with low q (high cash flow). The average returns for the long-short portfolio based on q and cash flow are −4.88% and 5.06%, and the corresponding Sharpe ratios are only −0.26 and 0.28, respectively. None of these three components has a stronger return predictability than EIG, indicating that the superior performance of EIG must come from the interaction of these three components.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
The coefficients of the linear combination of momentum, q, and cash flow in EIG are determined by future investment growth -the left-hand-side variable in the first-stage predictive regression. To illustrate the importance of this variable, we repeat our analysis but now replace the left-hand-side variable with future sales growth (Panel D) and gross profit growth (Panel E), so our portfolio sorting variables are expected sales growth and expected gross profit growth, respectively. In Panel D, the strategy based on the expected sales growth generates an average return of 8.6% per year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.37. The strategy return based on expected gross profit growth in Panel E is only about 2% per year with a small Sharpe ratio of 0.1. In addition, we entertain an investment strategy based on EIG, but when constructing EIG, we use the benchmark coefficients perturbed by some noises. The noise for each coefficient is independent from each other, and has zero mean and standard deviation that is equal to the time series standard deviation of the same estimated coefficient from the investment growth predictive regression Equation (1). Panel F of Table 9 reports the results from this perturbed EIG strategy. It turns out that this alternative strategy outperforms all other strategies reported in this table, including the pure momentum strategy from Panel A. Its average return is 17.5% per year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.85. The strong performance of this perturbed EIG strategy provides another robustness check for our previous analysis. However, its inferior performance relative to our benchmark EIG strategy reconfirms the valuable information about future stock returns contained in investment growth. 12
Understanding return predictability of EIG
In the previous section, we document that firms' EIG can strongly predict future stock returns.
Our goal in this section is to have a better understanding of the sources of this return predictability.
Section 4.1 uncovers a close relation between EIG and financial distress risk. In Section 4.2, we further document some interesting findings that support a risk-based explanation and some other evidence for a behaviorial interpretation.
EIG and Financial Distress
In Table 3 , we document that firms with high EIG have better stock performance and accounting profitability than firms with low EIG. In particular, the bottom decile EIG portfolio has past 12-month return of −37% and cash flow-capital ratio of −1.03, as compared with 94% and 0.39, respectively, for the top decile EIG portfolio. Both variables are important components of the FP measure in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) . In this section, we investigate the relation between EIG and financial distress risk in more detail.
Panel A of Table 10 reports the average values of traditional measures of financial distress used in the literature across the EIG decile portfolios. We consider four traditional distress measures including failure probability (FP, 12 month lag benchmark model, for the high EIG portfolio. Z-score also increases monotonically from the bottom to the top decile EIG portfolios.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
We also directly test if EIG predicts bankruptcy in logit models as in Section II of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) . Specifically, we assume for firm i, the probability of bankruptcy in month j, conditional on its survival in month j − 1, has the following logistic distribution:
where Y it is an indicator that equals to one if the firm goes bankrupt in month t, and x i,t−1 are explanatory variables that include FP and EIG at the end of previous month. As in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) , we consider horizons of 1 month, 6 months and 1, 2, and 3 years.
The data for the bankruptcy indicator is from Chava and Jarrow (2004) , Chava (2014) , and Alanis, Chava, and Kumar (2015) . 14 We construct FP following the procedure in Campbell, Hilscher, and 13 Note, FP is not the actual failure probability. Instead, it is αj + βjxi,t−1 from Equation (2) below, which is a monotonic transformation of failure probability. The construction of these variables is discussed in detail in Appendix.
14 We thank Sudheer Chava for sharing this dataset with us. The bankruptcy indicator equals one in a month in Panel B of Table 10 reports the estimation results, including the McFadden's pseudo-R 2 , calcu-
where L 1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model and L 0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. In the univariate regressions of all horizons, the coefficient on EIG is strongly negative, indicating that firms with lower EIG are more likely to go bankrupt. At the 1-month horizon, the estimated coefficient for EIG is −9.73, which is more than 30 standard deviations from zero. This coefficient gradually decreases with the predictive horizons:
it becomes −6.84 in 6 months, −5.07 in 1 year, and even at a horizon of 3 years, the coefficient for EIG remains −1.55 with a t-statistic of −8.66. The McFadden's pseudo-R 2 follows a similar pattern: it starts from 13.8% in 1 month, decays to 5.3% in 12 months, and becomes only 0.6% in 3-year horizon.
Panel B also reports the result from the univariate logistic regression using FP. Consistent with Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) , FP has very strong predictive power for corporate bankruptcy. At the 1-month horizon, the coefficient of FP is 1.45 (t-statistic = 28.56) and the estimated pseudo-R 2 is 20.7%. The coefficient decreases with horizons at a lower speed than the coefficient for EIG. Even at the 36-month horizon, the coefficient on FP remains 58% of the 1-month estimate. In the last specification at each predictive horizon, we include both FP and EIG into the same logit regression, and see if EIG still has marginal predictive power for corporate bankruptcy even controlling for FP. Our estimation suggests that the coefficient on EIG remains negative and statistically significant up to 1-year horizon, and the addition of the predictive power is mainly concentrated in the short horizon. For example, in the 1-month horizon, the coefficient on EIG is −5.31 (t-statistic = −13.32) and the estimation pseudo-R 2 increases to 22.9% from 20.7% in the univariate regression using only FP. 16 We want to emphasize that the purpose of the above analyses is not to provide another corporate bankruptcy predictor. FP from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) is already sophisticated and incorporates information from both long and short horizons. However, we still find it interesting that EIG contains additional information that predicts corporate bankruptcy at a shorter horizon.
As we will see below, the information at the shorter horizon has strong return predictability.
In Panel A of 15 Specifically, in each year from 1981 to 2014, we estimate the logistic regression using only historically available data to eliminate look-ahead bias. The estimated coefficients are used together with the most up-to-date values of the same predictive variables to construct the out-of-sample FP. The predictive variables are NIMTAAVG, TLMTA, EXRET, EXRETAVG, RSIZE, CAHMTA, MB, and PRICE. The detailed definitions and construction procedure of these variables can be found in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) .
16 As a comparison, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) report that in the same 1-month horizon out-of-sample test, the coefficient on distance to default changes sign after including FP. In addition, the estimation pseudo-R 2 is almost the same as in the specification that only includes FP.
IV, 12 month lag, page 2913). Panel A.1 (A.2) reports the average EIG (FP) premium within each FP (EIG) quintile and average across FP (EIG) quintiles, which can be interpreted as EIG (FP) premium conditional on FP (EIG). Conditional on FP, the average EIG premium is 7.8% per year with a t-statistic of 3.18. The EIG premium is strong at 10.57% and 11.29% per year, respectively for firms with high and low FP. These values are higher than 6.8% in the mid FP quintile. In contrast, the average conditional FP premium is only 3.9% per year (t-statistic = 1.3). Among the five EIG quintiles, the conditional FP premium is only statistically significant in the low EIG quintile. This double-sorted portfolio analysis suggests that EIG is a stronger predictor for future stock returns than FP.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
To understand why EIG outperforms FP in predicting future returns, we look at the dynamics of the buy-and-hold strategy that is based on the long-short decile portfolios sorted by either EIG or FP, as well as the dynamics of EIG and the four traditional measures of financial distress risk.
For the EIG (FP) strategy, the profit is 20.7% (12%) during the first year, but decays extremely fast to 1.14% (−3.13%) in the second year, and remains small in subsequent years. In contrast, all four traditional measures of financial distress are highly persistent. Take the FP strategy as an example. The difference in FP between low and high FP portfolios is −3.13 in the first year, and decreases to −2.29 in the second year, and −1.88 in the third year. Even five years after the portfolio formation, the difference in FP is still −1.44. The other three measures are even more persistent. Five years after portfolio formation, the difference in distance to default, O-score, and Z-score remain 69%, 78%, and 85%, respectively, of the value at the portfolio sort. In contrast, our EIG variable is much less persistent. For the EIG strategy, the difference in EIG between high and low EIG portfolios becomes only 31% of the original spread at the portfolio sort, and this value decays to only 13% after 5 years. The analysis suggests that given that all these five variables are related to financial distress, the measure that has the most similar persistence as the buy-and-hold strategy return should contain the cleanest information in predicting stock returns, because it is least contaminated by the persistent component of financial distress that has little return predictive power. Apparently, EIG is better than the other four measures from this perspective.
As a final note of this section, the relative strengths of the predictive power for corporate bankruptcy and stock return between EIG and FP is not contradictory. Intuitively, persistent variables such as market-to-book and stock prices are more likely to predict corporate bankruptcy in the long horizon, whereas transitory variable such as momentum and EIG are more likely to predict the corporate bankruptcy in shorter horizon. Our analyses suggest that it is the transitory component of expected bankruptcy that is more associated with future stock returns.
Potential Explanations
So far we have not provided any economic interpretation for the large EIG premium. In explaining cross-sectional stock returns, the asset pricing literature has been divided into the rational expec-tations side, in which the difference in average returns across stocks is due to the compensation for some risk factor(s), and the mispricing side, in which asset prices are subject to investors' behavioral biases and the limits to arbitrage prevent rational investors to arbitrage the mispricing away.
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence from both sides.
Evidence for Risk Explanations
In Section 3.1, we have already shown that the standard equity-based risk factors, such as the market factor, the value premium factor, and the size premium factor, cannot explain the EIG premium.
If anything, controlling for these risk factors makes the return difference even more puzzling. In this subsection, we find a standard business cycle variable -the aggregate consumption growthcould provide potentially capture the low average return of low EIG stocks. 17
Panel A of Table 12 reports the result from a two-factor model test on the decile EIG portfolios and the difference between the top and bottom decile portfolios, with the market excess return and the aggregate consumption growth as the risk factors. Firms with low EIG have a negative exposure to the consumption growth with an estimated coefficient of −3.32. The countercyclial payoff of this portfolio indicates that investors who are averse to business cycle fluctuations would find it attractive and demand a lower risk premium. In contrast, the high EIG portfolio return has a positive consumption beta of 0.49, though not statistically significant. The difference in the consumption beta between the high and low EIG portfolios is more than 2.4 standard deviations from zero, implying that the aggregate consumption risk exposure is in the right direction in explaining the EIG premium.
[Insert Table 12 Here] In Panel B of Table 12 , we also add the squared consumption growth to the right-hand-side of the time series regression. This extra quadratic term could potentially capture time variation of the consumption risk exposure that also varies with business cycles. It turns out that for the low EIG portfolio, the coefficient on the consumption growth becomes even stronger at −13.16 (t-statistic = −3.94), and the coefficient for the squared consumption growth is significantly positive at 1.62 (t-statistic = 3.31), indicating that while the portfolio payoff is countercyclical, the portfolio consumption risk exposure is highly procyclical. For example, when the consumption growth is one standard deviation above the sample average (i.e., the good state of the economy), the consumption beta is −4.77. 18 In contrast, when the economy is in (relatively mild) recession, defined as the aggregate consumption growth being one standard deviation below the sample average, the consumption beta is −10.76. Therefore, if the risk premium is also high in bad times, as predicted by leading asset pricing models such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) , the procyclical consumption beta makes these low EIG stocks extremely attractive, because they provide an effective hedge to the business cycle risk. On the other hand, although the consumption beta for high EIG firms is also negative and procyclical, the magnitude is much smaller. 19, 20 Our finding on the negative consumption beta of firms with low EIG is broadly consistent with the theoretical models that aim to rationalize momentum, such as those in Johnson (2002) and Li (2016) . Johnson (2002) assumes the logarithm of stock price with respect to dividend growth rate to be convex in an endowment economy. This convexity, together with the persistence of dividend growth rate, implies a positive relation between firm's risk premium and expected growth rate. In an investment-based framework, Li (2016) directly models investment plan friction at the firm level, and finds that firms that initiate greater investment plan have higher exposure to the stochastic price of investment goods and hence higher risk premium. The price of investment goods is highly countercyclical with respective to business cycles (see, e.g., Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) ), which could explain the pattern in the observed consumption betas across EIG portfolios.
It should also be noted that our result does not necessarily contradict the negative correlation between investment plans and future stock returns at the aggregate level, as documented in Lamont (2000) . Lamont (2000) argues that when there are lags between the decision to invest and the actual investment expenditure, the investment plan, rather than investment expenditure, increases in response to a fall in discount rate. As a result, greater aggregate investment plan predicts a lower market return. However, the previous argument is a partial equilibrium argument based on the assumption that the change in discount rate is exogenous. This assumption can be valid at the aggregate level (see, for example, Campbell and Shiller (1988a) , Campbell and Shiller (1988b), and Campbell (1991) ), but may not be as important at the firm level. In particular, the literature (e.g., Vuolteenaho (2002) ) has shown that, compared to the discount rate news, the cash flow news may have played a much more important role for the firm-level stock returns. Therefore, the firm-level realized stock return, investment decision, and risk premium could all be endogenous in response to firm-specific cash flow news. For instance, in the investment-based model of Li (2016), when a firm experiences a positive idiosyncratic productivity shock, it will optimally choose a greater investment plan, despite an increase in the firm's risk premium, because the cash flow effect from the assumed persistent productivity process can dominate the endogenous discount rate effect.
Evidence for Behavioral Explanations
In this final section, we investigate the behavioral bias-induced mispricing channel. Mispricing would occur when investors' behavioral biases generate an uninformed demand shock, and at the same time, limits to arbitrage prevent rational investors from fully absorbing this shock.
As Section 4.1 shows, EIG is closely related to financial distress, and low EIG stocks share similar characteristics with financial distress stocks. It is documented in the literature that distressed firms tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large return realizations (e.g., Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2014) ). If investors with lottery preferences tend to overweight and/or overestimate the probability of these extremely high return outcomes, distressed stocks could become attractive, get overpriced, and earn abnormally low future returns. 21 In what follows, we first examine the lottery feature of the EIG portfolios.
To measure the lottery feature of stocks, we use five standard proxies from the literature: the maximum daily return (Maxret) from Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) , the predicted jackpot probability (Jackpotp) from Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2014) , the expected idiosyncratic skewness (Skewexp) from Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) , lagged stock price, and the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) from Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) . Panel A in Table 13 presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional median lottery features for the decile EIG portfolios. Low EIG stocks are indeed lottery-like stocks: the bottom decile EIG portfolio tends to have low price, and high Maxret, Jackpotp, Skewexp, and IVOL. Therefore, if investors have a strong preference for lottery-like assets, these low EIG stocks would earn low future returns. Besides these lottery characteristics, we also report ex-post skewness over the next year for the EIG portfolios. If investors view low EIG stocks as lottery-like assets and are particularly enthusiastic about these stocks, we should see higher realized skewness of the stock returns as well. Indeed, the bottom decile has the highest ex-post skewness among all EIG portfolios, suggesting that EIG reflects stocks' lottery feature in the future.
[Insert Table 13 Here]
In the last two columns, we examine the earnings surprise, measured as the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and (-1,+1) three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around subsequent quarterly earnings announcement dates for stocks in the EIG portfolios. If lottery preferences are associated with systematic expectation errors and overestimation of small probability events, investors with lottery preferences would be surprised by the negative earnings news of low EIG stocks. Indeed, we find low EIG stocks on average have very negative SUE and CAR, partially driven by the correction of expectation errors upon earnings announcements. However, the annualized CAR spread between high and low EIG stocks during the three-day event window (3.44%) is still much lower than the EIG premium.
For a behavioral explanation, both an uninformed demand and limits to arbitrage are required for an equilibrium mispricing. The EIG premium, to the extent that it reflects mispricing, should be larger among firms that are more difficult to arbitrage and have greater information uncertainty. formation uncertainty, psychological biases are higher and information becomes more asymmetric among investors, leaving more room for mispricing. 22 In the rest of this section, we use the portfolio approach to study how the EIG premium varies with the severity of limits to arbitrage/information uncertainty. If mispricing plays a role in the EIG premium, the spread should be stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs or higher information uncertainty.
Specifically, we create 5-by-5 portfolios double sorted sequentially by each one of the limits to arbitrage/information uncertainty proexies and then by EIG. To measure arbitrage costs and information uncertainty, we use four standard proxies in the literature: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), institutional ownership (IO), analyst coverage, and analyst forecast dispersion. 23 Intuitively, firms with high IVOL, low IO, low analyst coverage, or high analyst forecast dispersion tend to have higher arbitrage costs and/or information uncertainty. Panel B in Table reports the double-sorted portfolio results. We use reciprocals of IO and analyst coverage to be consistent with other proxies so that higher-ranked portfolios contain stocks with more severe limits to arbitrage or more information uncertainty. As expected, the EIG premium is substantially stronger among firms with higher IVOL, fewer IO, less analyst coverage, and larger analyst forecast dispersion, that is, firms that are more difficult to arbitrage or have greater information uncertainty. For example, for the IVOL proxy, the average EIG premium increases from 5.43% in the low IVOL quintile (low arbitrage cost) to 16.12% in the high IVOL quintile (high arbitrage cost). The difference in the EIG premium between these two quintiles is 10.69% per year with a t-statistic of 2.87. Similarly, the difference in the Fama-French three-factor model alpha for the EIG premium between low and high IVOL quintiles is on average 10.35% with a t-statistic of 2.92. We also find the same pattern for the other proxies. 24
To summarize the result from this subsection, we provide empirical evidence for a behaviorial interpretation that low EIG stocks are lottery-like assets that could be attractive to investors with lottery preferences. The EIG premium is significantly stronger among firms with high arbitrage costs and/or information uncertainty, consistent with the notion that when facing high information uncertainty, investors' decisions tend to be more affected by behavioral biases, leaving more room for mispricing, and meanwhile arbitrage costs could deter the mispricing from being fully corrected.
22 Prior studies find that many asset pricing anomalies are more pronounced among firms with more limits to arbitrage and information uncertainty. Notable recent papers include Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) on book-tomarket; Nagel (2005) on book-to-market, analyst forecast dispersion, turnover, and volatility; Zhang (2006) on price continuation anomalies; Li and Zhang (2010) on investment growth, net operating assets, and net stock issues; and Lam and Wei (2011) on asset growth, among others.
23 Please see Appendix for detailed construction of these variables. 24 Even though the result on limits-to-arbitrage and information uncertainty in Panel B of Table 13 is consistent with standard behaviorial arguments, we acknowledge that this finding could also be consistent with some risk-based interpretations in which the risk premium of the long-short EIG portfolio is stronger among firms with higher IVOL, fewer IO, less analyst coverage, and larger analyst forecast dispersion.
In this paper, we document that the firm-level expected investment growth (EIG) has strong and positive predictive power for future stock returns. A long-short investment strategy based on EIG generates an average annual return of more than 20%, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.01. Leading factor models including CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model, the more recent Hou, Xue, and Zhang four-factor model, and Fama and French five-factor model all fail to fully capture the profitability of this investment strategy. The result is robust to subperiods and different subsamples of firms, including S&P 500 index constituents and stocks with a lag price of more than $5 per share. Our analyses suggest that EIG is closely related to the financial distress risk, especially its transitory component at a horizon up to one year. The shorter horizon component turns out to be very important for the stock return predictability, since the buy-andhold return of the long-short EIG strategy is only profitable up to one year. This finding provides a natural explanation for the better performance of our EIG measure than the failure probability from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns.
We provide some empirical evidence for both risk-based explanation and behavioral explanation for this large EIG premium. On the risk side, we find the payoff of the low EIG portfolio is highly countercyclical with respect to aggregate consumption growth, and the consumption beta is highly procyclical. The pattern in consumption beta therefore provides an effective hedge for the business cycle risk. When the consumption risk premium is also countercyclical either due to price of risk (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ) or due to quantity of risk (Bansal and Yaron (2004) ), the expected return of the low EIG portfolio can be quite low or even negative, as compared to the high EIG portfolio. On the behavioral side, we find the low EIG stocks show similar feature as lottery-like assets, so if investors have a strong preference for lotteries, these stocks could be overpriced and have lower returns in the future. In addition, the EIG premium is stronger among firms with more severe limits on arbitrage and/or information uncertainty, for instance, firms with high idiosyncratic volatility, low institutional ownership, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantitatively decompose the EIG premium into a risk premium component and a mispricing component. Our conjecture is that both components should play an important role just as other cross-sectional stock anomalies. However, it remains an interesting question why low EIG firms have low consumption beta on average, and why the consumption beta is highly procyclical. A general equilibrium model with a representative agent and a rich cross section of firms making their financing, investment, and bankruptcy decisions could be potentially fruitful along this dimension. In addition, our analyses suggest that while both the short-horizon and long-horizon components of financial distress risk predict corporate bankruptcy, it is only the short-horizon component that has strong predictive power for stock returns. We leave the exploration of this puzzling but interesting empirical finding for future studies.
Appendix
In this appendix, we provide details for constructing our financial distress, lottery feature, limits to arbitrage, and information uncertainty measures.
• Our financial distress measures include:
FP : Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) (Table IV, 12 month lag, page 2913), for each firm, we use the most recently available Compustat quarterly and CRSP data to compute a distress score:
The coefficient φ = 2 −1/3 implies that the weight is halved each quarter. NIMTA is net income (Compustat quarterly item NIQ) divided by the sum of market equity and total liabilities (Compustat quarterly item LTQ). The moving average NIMTAAVG uses a longer history of losses that can better predict bankruptcy than a single month. EXRET = log(1 + R it ) − log(1 + R S&P 500,t ) is the monthly log excess return on each firm's equity relative to the S&P 500 index. To use its moving average, the model assumes that a sustained decline in stock market value could better predict bankruptcy than a sudden stock price decline in a single month. TLMTA is total liability divided by the sum of market equity and total liabilities.
SIGMA is the volatility of daily stock returns over the past three months. RSIZE is the log ratio of each firm's market equity to that of the S&P 500 index. CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (Compustat quarterly item CHEQ) divided by the sum of market equity and total liabilities. MB is the market-to-book equity. PRICE is the log of stock price, winsorized at $15.
Distance to Default: Following Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) , distance to default is computed in two steps. In the first step, we solve a system of two nonlinear equations simultaneously:
where T A DD is total assets, SIGM A D D is the volatility of total assets, M E is market equity, BD is the face value of debt that matures at time T , R BILL is risk-free rate measured by Treasury bill rate, T is assume to be 1 following Vassalou and Xing (2004) ,
, and
We use T A DD = M E + BD and SIGM A DD = SIGM A(M E/(M E + BD)) as the initial value in iteration until we find T A DD and SIGM A DD that are consistent with their observed values. In the second step, we compute distance to default as: Z − score t = 1.2 working capital t total assets t + 1.4 retained earnings t total assets t + 3.3 earnings before interest and taxes t total assets t + 0.6 market value of equity t book value of total liabilities t + sales t total assets t .
• Our lottery measures include:
Maxret: Following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), we use each stock's maximum daily return (Maxret) within each month as our first measure of lottery feature.
Jackpotp:
The predicted jackpot probability is constructed from the baseline model in Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2014) (Table 3 , Panel A, page 461). In particular, for each firm, we first estimate the baseline logit model using data from the past 20 years at the end of June every year:
where Jackpot i,t is a dummy that equals to 1 if firm i's log return in the next 12 month period is larger than 100%. The vector X i,t−1 is a set of firm-specific variables known at time t − 1, including skewness of log daily returns (centered around 0) over the last 3 months, log stock return over the past year, firm age as the number of years since appearance on CRSP, asset tangibility as the ratio of gross PPE (property plant and equipment) to total assets, the log of sales growth over the prior year, detrended stock turnover as the difference between the average past 6-month turnover and the average past 18-month turnover, volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns (centered around 0) over the past 3 months, and the log of market equity in thousands. Next, we use these estimated parameters to construct the out-of-sample predicted jackpot probability (Jackpotp). We reestimate this model for each firm every year from 1951, so our first set of out-of-sample predicted jackpot probabilities is from January 1972.
Skewexp:
The expected idiosyncratic skewness is calculated in two steps following Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) ( Table 2 , Model 6, page 179). First, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions separately at the end of each month t:
where is i,t and iv i,t denote the historical estimates of idiosyncratic volatility and skewness relative to the Fama and French three-factor model, respectively, for firm i using daily stock data over the past 60 months till month t. X i,t is a set of firm-specific variables including momentum as the cumulative returns over months t − 72 through t − 61, turnover as the average daily turnover in month t − 60, small-size market capitalization dummy, mediumsize market capitalization dummy, industry dummy based on the Fama-French 17-industries definition, and the NASDAQ dummy. After we have these regression parameters, the expected idiosyncratic skewness for each firm i at the end of each month t is then computed in the second step:
Ivol : Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), we compute Ivol as the standard deviation of daily residual returns relative to Fama and French (1993) three-factor model within each month.
• Our limits to arbitrage/information uncertainty proxies include:
IO: IO is computed as the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors.
Analyst coverage: analyst coverage is measured by the number of analysts following the firm. Following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , analyst forecast dispersion is computed as the standard deviation of analysts' one-year EPS forecasts scaled by absolute value of the mean forecast.
Analyst forecast dispersion:
• Non-US G7 countries: Following Gao, Parsons, and Shen (2015) , for each country, we only include non-financial and non-utility common stocks traded on its major national stock ex- (1)), q (column (2)), cash flow (CF, column (3)), and all three variables together (column (4)). Every December from 1951 to 2014, we run cross-sectional predictive regressions of firms' investment growth on its lagged MOM, q, and CF, among NYSE common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) with a December fiscal year end. Investment growth is computed as the growth rate in capital expenditures (Compustat data item CAPX). MOM is the prior 2-12 month cumulative return. q is computed as the market value of the firm (sum of Market equity, long-term debt, and preferred stock minus inventories and deferred taxes) divided by capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). CF is the sum of depreciation (Compustat data item DP) and income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) divided by capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles.
Variables
(1) Table 2 : Expected investment growth and future investment growth This table reports the future investment growth of EIG portfolios. Panel A reports the average (i.e., the time series mean of cross-sectional median) investment growth in the first four quarters (Q1-Q4), as well as in the first year (Y1), second year (Y2), third year (Y3), and the fifth year (Y5) following EIG decile formations. In Panel B, we create 5-by-5 portfolios by sequentially sorting stocks by one conditioning variable and then by EIG, where the conditioning variable is momentum (MOM), q, or cash flow (CF). We then report the average conditional spread in investment growth between the top and bottom EIG quintiles in the first year following portfolio formations. We also report the average conditional investment growth spread (Ave.) across all quintiles in the first sorting dimension. Annual (quarterly) investment growth (in percentages) is computed as the growth rate in capital expenditures from the previous year (quarter). We use the past four-quarter moving average of capital expenditure as the quarterly adjusted capital expenditure to smooth out seasonality. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987) . The sample includes NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) with a December fiscal year end from 1953 to 2015. This table reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional median firm characteristics in Panel A and the value-weighted average excess returns (Ret e ), standard deviation (Std), Sharpe Ratio (SR), Skewness (Skew), and Kurtosis (Kurt) of the decile EIG portfolios in Panel B. At the beginning of every month, we sort NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) into EIG deciles. ME is market equity in million dollars. BM is the book value of equity divided by market value at the end of the last fiscal year. IK is investment (Compustat data item CAPX) over capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). CF is the sum of depreciation (Compustat data item DP) and income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) divided by capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). Gross Profitability (GP) is defined as income (Compustat data item REVT minus Compustat data item COGS) divided by total assets (Compustat data item AT). Leverage (LEV) is book value of debt divided by total assets. The sample period is from July 1953 to December 2015. This table reports includes NYSE/AMEX (non-financial and non-utility) common stocks. Panel C only includes S&P 500 stocks from the previous month. Panel D only includes NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) with a lag price greater than $5 per share. At the beginning of every month, we sort stocks in each sample into EIG deciles. We report the valueweighted excess returns (Ret e ), standard deviation (Std), Sharpe ratio (SR), skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), and the abnormal return from Fama-French three-factor model (α F F 3 ). The returns and alphas are annualized and reported in percentages. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987 Table 7 : Double-sorted portfolios At the beginning of each month, we divide all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) into 5-by-5 portfolios sequentially double-sorted by one characteristic and EIG. We report the average value-weighted returns (Panel A) and Fama-French three-factor model alphas (Panel B) for the long-short EIG portfolio within each firm characteristic quintile, and the average EIG premium across characteristic quintiles. Firm characteristics we consider include: firm market value (ME), book-to-equity ratio (BM), prior 2-12 month cumulative returns (Mom), gross profitability (GP), asset growth (AG), and investment growth (IG). The returns and alphas are annualized and reported in percentages. The sample period is from July 1953 to December 2015. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987 Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) , distance to default (DD), Olson (1980) O-score, and Altman (1968) Z-score. The construction of these variables is discussed in detail in Appendix. Panel B reports the coefficients of EIG and FP, number of observations, and McFadden's R 2 in the out-of-sample logistic regression to predict corporate bankruptcy in the 1-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year horizons. To construct the out-of-sample FP, each year, we estimate the logistic regression using only historically available data to eliminate look-ahead bias. The estimated coefficients are used together with the most up-to-date values of the same predictive variables to construct the out-of-sample FP. The sample period is January 1981 to December 2014. Table 13 : Behavioral evidence for EIG portfolios Panel A reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional median firm characteristics for the decile EIG portfolios. At the beginning of every month, we sort NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) into EIG deciles. Maxret is the maximum daily return in the last month from Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) (Maxret) , Jackpotp is the predicted jackpot probability from Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2014) , Skewexp is the expected idiosyncratic skewness from Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) , LagPrc is the stock price at the portfolio formation date, IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility from Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) , Skew expost is the ex-post skewness calculated from daily returns over the next year, and the earnings surprise (SUE, in percentages) is calculated as the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the median consensus EPS forecast of analysts for that quarter normalized by stock price. CAR are the cumulative excess returns (in excess of value-weighted market returns) during (-1,+1) earnings announcements window centered at the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement date. The sample period is from July 1953 to December 2015 for Maxret, LagPrc, IVOL, and Skew expost , from January 1972 to December 2015 for Jackpotp, and from January 1988 to December 2015 for Skewexp, January 1985 to December 2015 for SUE, and October 1970 to December 2015 for CAR. Panel B reports the excess returns (Ret e ) and Fama-French three-factor alphas (α F F 3 ) for the EIG premium within each one of the quintile limits-to-arbitrage/information uncertainty proxy portfolios, and the difference between top and bottom quintile limits-to-arbitrage/information uncertainty proxy portfolios. We consider four limits-to-arbitrage/information uncertainty proxies: IVOL, institutional Ownership (IO), analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion. IO is computed as the percentage of firms' shares held by institutional investors. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following the firm. Following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , forecast dispersion is computed as the standard deviation of analysts' one-year EPS forecasts scaled by absolute value of the mean forecast. We use reciprocals of IO and analyst coverage to be consistent with other proxies so that higher-ranked portfolios are stocks with more severe limits to arbitrage or more information uncertainty. The returns and alphas are annualized and reported in percentages. The sample period is from July 1953 to December 2015 for IVOL, from April 1980 to December 2015 for IO, and from February 1985 to December 2015 for analyst coverage and forecast dispersion. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987 This figure plots the cumulative wealth of investing $1, at the beginning of July 1953, in the longshort portfolio based on three investment strategies (EIG, Momentum, and Value) and the passive market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate. The long-short portfolio is the difference between the top and bottom decile EIG (MOM, or BM) portfolios. EIG, MOM, and BM are computed in the same way as in Table 3 . The strategy returns are normalized to have the same standard deviation as that for the return of the EIG strategy. The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (excluding financial and utility stocks) from July 1953 to December 2015. 
